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This edited panel discussion from the 2019 Business Law Prof Blog
symposium, Business Transactions: Connecting the Threads III, features three
professors from The University of Tennessee College of Law who are
going to talk about mergers from different substantive law and practice
angles. The panel moderator, Taylor Smith, is a third-year student at The
University of Tennessee College of Law. Dixon Babb, also a third-year
student at The University of Tennessee College of Law, provides
commentary.
Smith:

Approximately 10 years ago, three professors at The
University of Tennessee College of Law found themselves
by a water cooler talking about mergers, equity sales, and
asset sales. In their conversation that day, the three
professors began to scope out various concepts relating to
mergers and acquisitions. Based on the distinct
perspectives provided by their respective professional
backgrounds, they offered a complex, and sometimes
contradictory, picture of these intricate corporate finance
transactions, which we will discuss today. 1
We will start with Professor Heminway. What policy goals
underlie your area of legal expertise as they apply to
mergers?
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1 While this panel discussion cannot replicate that moment in full, the edited
transcribed discussion that follows attempts to be faithful to the original as much as
possible.
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Thanks, Taylor. That is a great question. I think all of us
may have slightly different views on that question. I will
get to mine in a moment.
Let me begin by thanking my co-bloggers from the
Business Law Prof Blog for coming here to UT Law and
regaling us with your knowledge. Also, I offer thanks to
my colleagues, including these two guys whom I
conscripted into a conversation many moons ago. Finally,
I am grateful for our students from the Transactions journal,
who have been doing a great job in organizing this
conference and participating in today’s proceedings—
including those working with us on this panel, Taylor and
Dixon. I also want to acknowledge the extraordinary
efforts of Colleen Conboy, who organized this whole day.
I do not think we can praise her enough for that.
Having given those expressions of gratitude, one matter is
important to note as we begin to talk about policy
perspectives—goals and purposes—underlying the laws
we will discuss today. All three of the lawyers on this panel
are, in principal part, advisors. This is an important
predicate to our discussion. Among other things, how we
characterize our roles in mergers and acquisitions affects
our professional obligations. From the standpoint of the
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the second paragraph of the Preamble 2
specifically instructs us that our role as advisors is to
provide “a client with an informed understanding of the
client’s legal rights and obligations” and to explain “their
practical implications.” Each of us takes that responsibility
seriously, as will be illustrated today.
Model Rule 2.1 3 offers more guidance, elaborating on the
guidance provided in the Preamble. The comments to that
rule, specifically comment 2, provide that “[a]dvice
couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a
client, especially where practical considerations, such as
cost or effects on other people, are predominant.” 4 The

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 2 (AM . BAR ASS’N 2016).
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(“providing what a lawyer shall and may do in the role of an advisor”).
4 Id. cmt. 2.
2
3
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comment goes on to note that “[p]urely technical legal
advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate.” 5
Understanding the policies underlying the different types
of law that we are going to discuss is critical to that
advisory capacity. The purposes and objectives of
different areas of law help us to interpret and bridge gaps
in those areas of law as we determine how to advise our
clients. I practice in the area of business finance, more
commonly known as corporate finance. That area of
practice requires knowledge and skill in the law of business
associations and securities regulation. Accordingly, I focus
primarily on those two areas of law in my piece of this
discussion.
Business associations law exists to facilitate people getting
into business with each other, pure and simple. 6 The
statutes that govern the different forms of business
entities offer distinct off-the-shelf options—rules relating
to the structure, ownership, management, control, and
operation of a business firm. Within business associations
law, the law of mergers anticipates the fact that businesses
will want to combine—specifically, that one business may
want to take on another during the course of their
respective business lifetimes. With that, the law anticipates
the need for, and desirability of, business combinations by
facilitating those transactions.
Securities regulation exists for different purposes. That
area of law focuses on protecting investors, on
maintaining fair markets for financial instruments, and on
encouraging the formation of capital in businesses. 7 Those
Id.
William Klein, Criteria for Good Laws of Business Association, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 13
(2005) (The law of business associations has many facets covering structure, governance,
and finance. Professor Klein collected twenty-eight “criteria for good laws of business
association” organized under four general classifications); id. at 15 (“The ‘laws of
business association’ contemplated in this paper consist of the statutes, regulations,
judicial interpretations and rules, and commonly used legal forms relating to the
organization of business entities; relationships among shareholders, managers, and other
stakeholders; and securities market regulation.”).
7 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Internet, Securities Regulation, and Theory of Law, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1319, 1324 n.16 (1998) (“Underlying the securities laws are two paramount
policies: the policy of protecting investors, designed to entice investors to put their
money at risk in the markets, and the policy of facilitating capital formation, designed to
5
6
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three objectives are effectuated through three basic
regulatory tools. 8 One is mandatory disclosure rules—
requirements to tell things to the public on a compulsory
basis. Another is anti-fraud protections and other liabilitydriven compliance. The third is substantive regulation of
the people and transactions involving financial
instruments that non-tax business lawyers call securities.
In terms of mergers, securities regulation can involve
things such as regulation of the voting process through
proxy regulation, as well as regulation of the exchange,
purchase, or sale of shares in business combination
transactions. That might include tender offer regulation or
going private regulation—taking a firm that has had access
to public securities markets and moving it into a different,
non-public space for securities trading.
The main lesson to derive from these objectives and
purposes is that there is a lot of business associations and
securities law to worry about in the mergers and
acquisitions context. Consequently, as I reflect on our
topic today, I am drawn to think about the attorney
competence rules. Our conversation is likely to be
bracketed a bit by that aspect of professional
responsibility, specifically Model Rule 1.1, which requires
legal counsel to be competent—to have “the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.” 9 I have always felt a bit
of a burden, albeit a happy one, working on mergers and
acquisitions because of that burden of competence.
I look forward to hearing what my colleagues have to say
about the purposes of their areas of legal expertise as they
assist issuers in raising capital.”); Lyman Johnson, Why Register Hedge Fund Advisers—A
Comment, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 713, 719 (2013) (“[I]nvestor protection and capital
formation are both key policy goals of federal securities laws.”); see also 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77b(b), 78c(f) (2020) (providing that the Securities and Exchange Commission is
statutorily obligated, in its own rulemaking and in reviewing self-regulatory organization
rulemaking, to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”).
8 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 828 (2014) (providing the three
objectives of securities regulation).
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM . BAR ASS’N 2016).
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relate to business combinations and how they may or may
not dovetail with the policy objectives of corporate and
securities law in a mergers and acquisitions context.
Plank:

I understand that corporate law involves a lot of magic,
but I don’t believe in magic. I’m a property person, and I
look at this from the point of view of the purpose of
property law. Property law relates to the allocation of
resources, whether an efficient or inefficient allocation.
One of attributes of a property interest is the right to
exclude. The right to exclude I think promotes the more
efficient allocation of assets.
Many questions follow from the right to exclude. Who is
the property owner excluding? The world. Whoever has an
interest in a property has a right to exclude everybody else
from exercising those rights inherent in the respective
property interest.
Property law, unlike contract law, is not just a relationship
between parties to a transaction, or the relationship
between an owner of property and the thing itself. Instead,
it is the relationship between the parties to the transaction,
the property itself, and the rest of the world. This principle
raises certain questions from a theoretical perspective.
How do people exercise their right to exclude? They have
to provide notice to the world that they have a property
interest. That is a fundamental policy in property law.
There is also the practical element that follows the policy
aspect. The owner of property, or a person contemplating
acquiring or transferring property, has a fundamental risk.
For a buyer of property, for example, how does the buyer
know that they are receiving it bargained for? How does
the buyer know that they are receiving a good property
interest from the seller? Conversely, if an owner is trying
to sell, how does the owner know that they owned that
property interest? Additionally, how can they convince
others of their ownership and their right to transfer a good
property interest, including the right to exclude?
These considerations affect how property lawyers think
about the property consequences of a merger, which we
can talk about in a minute. Beyond these broader points,
there are specific policy considerations with respect to
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each particular type of a property interest. These
considerations also implicate whether or not a property
rule should in fact be respected in terms of whether a
merger will constitute a transfer or not. I’ll stop here and
pick up these points later.
Leatherman:

A tax lawyer thinks about the policies behind the treatment
of a merger a bit differently than a property or non-tax
business lawyer. Context matters, as different policies
apply to taxable and tax-free mergers. Such policies may be
derived from the statute (i.e., the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended, or the “Code”), judicial guidance, or
administrative guidance.
Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines
tax-free reorganizations, charts an uneven path, making it
difficult to state with particularity or precision the
principles and policies that distinguish taxable and tax-free
mergers. 10 In practice, for a merger to be tax free, the target
shareholders must receive a significant continuing
proprietary interest in the acquiring corporation in
exchange for their target stock, and the acquiring
corporation must continue the target’s historic business or
use a significant portion of the target’s historic assets in a
business. 11 Yet, the statutory requirements for a tax-free
reorganization depend vitally on form, and the statutory
variations are difficult to justify other than as historical
anomalies. 12

See 26 U.S.C § 368(a) (2020).
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d), (e) (1986); see 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (2020) (allowing
stock of the controlling parent of the acquiring corporation to be used); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(b)(1) (providing that the combination of corporations by merger must be
treated as corporations for federal income tax purposes); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)
(providing that other entities, such as limited or general partnerships, limited liability
partnerships, or limited liability companies may elect to be treated as corporations for
federal tax purposes); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a), (b)(1), (c)(1) (providing the “check-thebox” regulations, which assumes that any corporation is a C corporation). See generally 26
U.S.C. § 11 (2020) (providing tax imposition); 26 U.S.C.§§ 301-385 (2020) (providing tax
codes for corporations). Compare 26 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1378 (2020) (for the S corporation
provisions).
12 See generally 26 U.S.C. § 368(a) (2020) (providing that a reorganization can occur in
seven different ways).
10
11
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Those variations can be measured against three broad
principles of income taxation: equitability, administrability,
and economic efficiency. For an income tax system to be
equitable, persons with the same economic income should
bear the same tax. That principle, however, is often
compromised to try to make the tax law more
administrable, that is, easier to understand and simpler to
apply for both the government and taxpayers. For many,
the ultimate principle, which has gained increasing
prominence over the years, is to assure that the tax system
promotes economic efficiency. In thinking about
corporate acquisitions, a tax is economically efficient if the
buyer and seller (or sellers) are indifferent as to the form
of the transaction (i.e., whether stock or assets are
acquired).
At polar extremes, the tax treatment of corporate
acquisitions is relatively efficient. At one extreme, the
acquiring corporation transfers solely its voting common
stock as the consideration received by the target
shareholders. Whether that transaction is structured as a
target stock or asset acquisition, it is generally tax free to
the target shareholders, target corporation, and acquiring
corporation. 13 Under each alternative, however, the target
assets retain their historic bases. Further, if the transaction
qualifies for tax-free treatment, that treatment is
mandatory; the parties cannot elect to treat the transaction
in whole or in part as taxable.
At the other extreme, the acquiring corporation transfers
solely cash as the consideration ultimately received by the
target shareholders. If, for example, the target merges into
the acquiring corporation, the target and target
shareholders generally recognize gain or loss, and the

26 U.S.C. § 354(a) (2020) (target shareholders will not recognize gain or loss if
stock received is in pursuance of a reorganization, exchanged solely for stock of another
corporation party to the reorganization.); 26 U.S.C. § 361(a), (c) (2020) (providing nonrecognition for the target corporation on an asset transfer); 26 U.S.C. § 1032 (2020)
(providing non-recognition for the acquiring corporation on an asset transfer); see also 26
U.S.C. § 368(a) (2020) (defining reorganizations); cf. HOWARD E. ABRAMS & DON A.
LEATHERMAN, FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION 261–322 (8th ed. 2020) [hereinafter
ABRAMS & LEATHERMAN] (providing a general discussion of tax-free reorganizations).
13
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acquiring corporation takes a cost (i.e., fair market value)
basis in the target assets. 14
If, however, the acquiring corporation acquires target
stock, the acquiring corporation can treat the acquisition
for federal income tax purposes either as a stock
acquisition or, if it makes a Section 338 election, in many
ways as an asset acquisition. 15 If no Section 338 election is
made, then form is followed: the target shareholders
recognize gain or loss on their disposition of target stock,
the target recognizes no gain or loss and retains its historic
asset bases, and the acquiring corporation takes a cost basis
in the acquired target stock.
If, instead, the acquiring corporation makes a Section 338
election for the acquisition, the target is treated in many
ways for federal income tax purposes as if it sold its assets
to a newly formed subsidiary of the acquiring corporation
and liquidated. 16 On its deemed asset sale, the target
recognizes gain or loss and the deemed purchaser takes a
cost basis in those assets. Depending on the type of
Section 338 election made, a target shareholder is treated
either as selling its stock or as receiving a liquidating
distribution from the target. 17 Despite these tax fictions,
for non-tax purposes, the acquiring corporation simply
acquires target stock and the target remains in existence.
26 U.S.C. § 1001(2020) (providing the general recognition rule); 26 U.S.C. § 1012
(2020) (providing the cost basis rule); 26 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2020) (providing the general tax
treatment of target shareholders); see also ABRAMS & LEATHERMAN, supra note 13, at 207–
226 (providing discussion on 26 U.S.C. §§ 331–332). But see 26 U.S.C. § 332(a) (2020)
(providing non-recognition treatment for a corporate target shareholder that is affiliated
with the target before the merger); see 26 U.S.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(D), (a)(2)(H) (2020)
(providing that if the target shareholders control the acquiring corporation after the
merger, the transaction may qualify as a tax-free reorganization). See generally ABRAMS &
LEATHERMAN, supra note 13, at 284 (giving a brief discussion of all-cash D
reorganizations).
15 See 26 U.S.C. § 338(d)(3) (2020) (providing that a qualified stock purchase is present
when a corporation acquires an affiliated interest in stock over a 12-month period from
target shareholders unrelated to the acquiring corporation); see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 338(h)(3)(A) (2020) (defining “purchase”).
16 See 26 U.S.C. § 338(a) (2020); see also ABRAMS & LEATHERMAN, supra note 13 at
233–249 (providing a more extended discussion on § 338 elections).
17 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 332, 1001 (2020) (detailing the tax treatment of target shareholders
and corporations).
14
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Note that whether or not a Section 338 election is made,
if the acquiring corporation acquires all target stock and
then liquidates the target, neither the target nor acquiring
corporation recognize gain or loss on the liquidation, and
the acquiring corporation succeeds to the target’s tax
attributes, including its asset bases. 18 Thus, whether the
acquiring corporation ultimately retains the target stock or
acquires the target assets through liquidation, it can choose
whether the target recognizes gain or loss. If the acquiring
corporation opts for the recognition route, the target
assets will take fair market value bases. If it opts for the
non-recognition route, those assets will retain their historic
bases. In summary, the acquiring corporation can not only
choose to acquire target stock or assets, but also choose
whether the target recognizes gain or loss for federal
income tax purposes, a freedom that enhances economic
efficiency.
Note as well that if the consideration provided by the
acquiring corporation is not solely its voting common
stock or cash, the federal income tax consequences depend
vitally on the facts and defy a brief summary. It is for that
reason, among many others, that tax lawyers must be
involved at the earliest possible stage in discussions about
any corporate acquisition. In almost every deal, tax issues
drive the ultimate structure.
Heminway:

Of course, in my view, corporate and securities law drive
the deal—at least sometimes (although I acknowledge that
the structure of a transaction for a large public company
issuer is often most sensitive to tax considerations).
Tom, when we were preparing for this panel, you
articulated your own view of the purpose—the
objective—of tax law. Can you repeat that here?

Plank:
18See

Yes. Tax law is all about making sure the king gets enough
money to do whatever the king thinks is appropriate to do

Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (treating a qualified stock purchase and
liquidation of a target as separate steps for federal income tax purposes); see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 337(a) (2020) (providing non-recognition for the target corporation), 332(a) (providing
non-recognition for the acquiring corporation); 26 U.S.C. § 334(b) (2020) (providing the
transferred-basis rule); 26 U.S.C. § 381 (2020) (providing that the acquiring corporation
succeeds to many target tax attributes in a § 332 liquidation).
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for himself and his supporters. That is what tax law is all
about. Of course, property law is all about making sure
that the rich get richer. But also, about enabling the wantto-be rich to get rich.
Smith:

These are all good foundations for discussion. Professor
Heminway, let’s return to you and build from there. From
someone with your perspective, in your area of expertise,
what is a merger?

Heminway:

This is where the gloves really come off. With due respect
to both of my colleagues on this panel, and especially on
this first point to Professor Plank (given his earlier remark
about not believing in magic), for the corporate finance
lawyer, the answer to this question is really, really simple.
Mergers are magic. I must, however, unpack that a little.
What, exactly, do I mean by that—that mergers are magic?
I will attempt to explain.
Most may think, as Professor Leatherman earlier said (and
I will respectfully disagree with him, as well as Professor
Plank, on this, from my vantage point) that mergers are
really just about one business buying another. Certainly, it
all looks like that, in many cases.
In fact, depending on the structure of a business
combination transaction, it may be just that. A business
combination can be accomplished, of course, by buying a
business. That is a more commercial type of transaction
that can be effectuated by buying the assets or stock of a
corporation (or equity units in whatever the business might
be, if it is not a corporation).
However, mergers are different. You may have heard that
the area of law governing business combinations, is
generally termed “mergers and acquisitions,” or “M&A.”
That is because we corporate finance lawyers distinguish
acquisitions, which are akin to commercial buy and sell
transactions, from mergers, which are statutorily ordained.
That is a significant distinction, at least for corporate
finance lawyers. Mergers, unlike acquisitions, would not
exist absent legislative enactment and intervention.
Under general principles of business entity law, a merger
is actually one of several “basic,” or what we sometimes
also call “fundamental,” change transactions that are
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created, and exist, only by virtue of statutory law. Just like
the corporation (and, under current law, the limited
partnership and the limited liability company), a merger
exists only by legislative grace. This concept should be
familiar to anyone who has taken a Business Associations
course.
If firms desire to combine, they can follow those statutory
rules—the applicable statutory rules for a merger. They
involve setting up a specific kind of agreement, a contract,
that is provided for by law. They involve certain approval
rights, which I will say more about in a minute. They
involve filing a certificate of merger, or articles of merger,
and various additional things. If transaction participants
do everything the statute says to create a merger, then . . .
poof! They get a merger. That is magic, right? With a wave
of the statutory wand, the businesses are combined by
merger!
You cannot meet a merger, or a corporation, walking down
the street. Neither is naturally occurring. Legislatures must
enact provisions to create them. These statutes also
provide, in every state, specifically for the effects of a
merger that exist because of these statutory permissions.
Under Tennessee law, for example, the applicable
provision is Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-21-108,
entitled “Effect of Merger or Share Exchange.”
Subsection (a) of that particular statutory section in
Tennessee covers what happens when a merger becomes
effective pursuant to the statute. I am not going to read the
whole subsection because there are seven different items
listed there. But this subsection helps to illustrate why it is
useful to have Professors Plank and Leatherman on this
panel with me today, even though I must respectfully
disagree with their views on what a merger is.
One of the effects of a merger under Tennessee law, for
example, is that “[a]ll property owned by, and every
contract right possessed by, each corporation, or eligible
entity that is merged into the survivor [of the merger] shall
be vested in the survivor without reversion or
impairment.” 19 All liabilities also are vested in the survivor
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-108(a)(2) (2020); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 259(a) (2020) (“[T]he rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of said
19
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upon the merger. 20 And a proceeding that is pending
against any corporation that is a target in a merger
transaction and does not survive the transaction becomes
the responsibility of the survivor. 21
The statute also provides that each equity unit–each share
of stock in the non-surviving corporation–becomes
whatever the merger agreement says it becomes; this
typically can be shares in the surviving corporation, assets,
or cash. 22 Modern merger statutes allow significant
[constituent] corporations, and all property, real, personal and mixed, and all debts due
to any of said constituent corporations on whatever account, as well for stock
subscriptions as all other things in action or belonging to each of such corporations shall
be vested in the corporation surviving . . . such merger . . . ; and all property, rights,
privileges, powers and franchises, and all and every other interest shall be thereafter as
effectually the property of the surviving . . . corporation as they were of the several and
respective constituent corporations, and the title to any real estate vested by deed or
otherwise, under the laws of this State, in any of such constituent corporations, shall not
revert or be in any way impaired by reason of this chapter.”).
20 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-108(a)(3) (2020) (“All liabilities of each
corporation or eligible entity that is merged into the survivor shall be vested in the
survivor”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (2020) (“[A]ll debts, liabilities and duties of
the respective constituent corporations shall thenceforth attach to said surviving . . .
corporation, and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if said debts, liabilities
and duties had been incurred or contracted by it.”).
21 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-108(a)(4) (2020) (“A proceeding pending
against any corporation . . . that is a party to the merger may be continued as if the merger
did not occur or the name of the survivor may be substituted in the proceeding for any
corporation . . . whose existence ceased in the merger”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 261
(2020) (“Any action or proceeding . . . pending by or against any corporation which is a
party to a merger . . . shall be prosecuted as if such merger . . . had not taken place, or
the corporation surviving . . . such merger . . . may be substituted in such action or
proceeding.”).
22 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-102(c)(3) (2020) (“The plan of merger must
set forth: . . . [t]he manner and basis of converting the shares of each merging . . . business
corporation . . . into shares or other securities, eligible interests, obligations, rights to
acquire shares, other securities or eligible interest, cash, other property, or any
combination of the foregoing.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(4) (“The agreement
shall state . . . [t]he manner, if any, of converting the shares of each of the constituent
corporations . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(5) (2020) (Delaware law further
provides that shares of stock of the constituent corporations may be converted “into
shares or other securities of the corporation surviving . . . the merger . . . and, if any
shares of any of the constituent corporations are not to remain outstanding, to be
converted solely into shares or other securities of the surviving or resulting corporation
or to be cancelled, . . . [into] cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation
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freedom of contract in this regard. The merger
consideration is really whatever the merger agreement says.
You may have noticed me using the terms “target” and
“survivor” in describing a merger. Let me explain the
meaning of those terms so that we all are clear on this
terminology. In a direct merger that involves two firms
(typically referred to as constituent firms), one survives (is
the survivor) and the other does not (it ceases to exist),
automatically, by operation of law. In a triangular or
subsidiary merger, we often refer to a target firm. The
target firm is the operating firm that is merged with and
into, or that survives, a merger with a subsidiary of another
firm. So, there are three firms involved in this type of
business combination, hence the use of the term
“triangular.” A triangular merger results in either (i) the
target firm becoming a subsidiary wholly owned by the
other operating firm involved in the business combination,
or (ii) the target firm’s entire business magically vesting in
a subsidiary of the other operating firm involved in the
business combination. 23
A few other points are worth mentioning at this juncture.
First, under corporate law, which offers the most intricate
set of merger rules, a wholly domestic merger is
authorized by action of the boards of directors of the
combining firms and, typically, at least the shareholders of
the non-surviving corporation (even if not the
shareholders of the surviving corporation as well). 24 The

or entity . . . , which cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation or entity
may be in addition to or in lieu of shares or other securities of the surviving or resulting
corporation.”).
23 See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 743, 746 (2008) (describing reverse triangular and direct
mergers); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Introduction to This Symposium and A Guide to Issues in
Mergers and Acquisitions, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 533, 557 (1997) (describing direct and reverse
triangular mergers); Elaine D. Ziff, The Effect of Corporate Acquisitions on the Target Company’s
License Rights, 57 BUS. LAW. 767, 783 (2002) (describing forward and reverse mergers to
include direct, forward triangular, and reverse triangular mergers).
24 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)–(c), (f)–(h) (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 253 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-104(1)–(2), (7) (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-21-105 (2013).
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laws that govern unincorporated business associations
provide similar approval rules. 25
Second, there can be mergers between different kinds of
business entities. Limited partnerships or limited liability
companies can merge with and into corporations and vice
versa in most states in the union. In addition, you can have
cross-border mergers between entities organized in
different U.S. states and between entities organized in U.S.
states and entities organized under the laws of other
countries, if and as permitted by law. Modern merger
statutes are very inclusive in that regard. 26
Here, concerns emerge again about competence. 27 A
corporate finance lawyer must ask herself whether she can
represent entities organized in different jurisdictions. She
must consider her competence to advise under multiple
laws. She must ask herself, “Can I do this under Model
Rule 1.1?” Diligence may also be a matter of concern.
There is a lot of diligence required in these transactions.
Diligence is the subject of Model Rule 1.3, requiring legal
counsel to “act with reasonable diligence . . . in representing
a client. 28

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-902(b) (2017) (providing for approval of
partnership mergers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211(b) (2019) (providing for approval
of limited partnership mergers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-209(b) (2019) (providing
for approval of limited liability company mergers);TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-702(c)
(2012) (providing for approval of limited liability company mergers); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 61-1-905(c) (2002) (providing for approval of partnership mergers); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 61-3-1106 (2018) (providing for approval of limited partnership mergers).
26 In Tennessee, for example, this inclusiveness is accomplished through statutory
provisions that allow for mergers to occur between domestic corporations and “eligible
entities,” as well as other domestic corporations. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-101(2)
(2013) (defining “Eligible entity” as “a domestic or foreign unincorporated entity or a
domestic or foreign nonprofit corporation”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-102(a) (2013)
(“One (1) or more corporations may merge with one (1) or more domestic or foreign
business corporations or eligible entities pursuant to a plan of merger, or two (2) or more
foreign business corporations or domestic or foreign eligible entities may merge into a
new domestic business corporation to be created in the merger in the manner provided
in this chapter.”). Delaware handles the different types of merger through different
statutory sections. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251–58.
27 See Heminway, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
28 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM . BAR ASS’N 2016).
25
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Finally, the securities lawyer in me compels me to
recognize that any publicly held firm and any firm that is
deemed to be offering, selling, or purchasing securities of
any kind (including equity, debt, derivative, and hybrid
instruments, among others) must comply with relevant
federal and state securities law principles as well. Securities
law, unlike business entity law, does not view mergers as
magic. Securities law takes a highly technical compliance
view of mergers. Depending on the type of merger, what
it is designed to achieve, who is participating, and what
consideration is being offered, securities law will regulate
differently. This also increases the level of complexity for
legal advisors, affording them one more reason to assess
competence under Model Rule 1.1.
So, in brief, that is what a merger is, to me, in my areas of
practice.
Plank:

For me, a merger, in terms of the policies that I am
worried about, involves a transfer of assets. It may be a
transfer by operational law; but if ABC Corporation owns
Blackacre, and ABC Corporation has merged into XYZ
Corporation, ABC disappears, and now XYZ Corporation
owns Blackacre. I do not have any concern about the
merger statutes effecting a transfer. But a transfer of
property interest raises two important issues. First, do you
have an effective transfer? There are all kinds of
requirements with normal transfers. For example, in the
typical transfer of real estate, do you have a deed? Is it
effective? Does it describe the property? There are all
kinds of requirements. On top of that, because the
property involves a right to exclude, the transferee must
perfect the transfer or the purchaser’s interest. What does
“perfect” mean? Perfect means to make this interest being
transferred good against the world. 29 That is done
primarily through providing some form of notice.

The requirement for perfection is an important exception to the basic property
principle of first in time, first in right, also expressed as nemo dat, which is the principle
that one cannot give an interest in property that one does not have. See generally Thomas
E. Plank, Article 9 of the UCC: Reconciling Fundamental Property Principles and Plain Language,
68 BUS. LAW. 439, 449–62 (2013) (describing the property principle of nemo dat and the
extent to which perfection requirements can either strengthen nemo dat or provide an
exception to this property principle).
29
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So, in property law, there are two things to worry about,
effectiveness of the transfer and perfection of the transfer.
The merger statutes do not deal with perfection at all, as
far as I can tell. This fact does not surprise me because
perfection is not really their concern. They do seem to
affect a transfer by simply saying that the property of ABC
Corporation is now vested in XYZ Corporation. The
concept of vesting is really a property loan concept, and
the merger statutes should be construed to transfer ABC
Corporation’s property interests to XYZ Corporation.
Now that there has been a merger, I want to make sure
that XYZ Corporation can satisfy the policy concerns of
property law. I want to make sure that XYZ’s property
interest is perfected, and that perfection will vary
depending on the type of property item involved.
The term perfection is very prominent in Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code which deals with security
interests in personal property as well as the sale of
receivables, 30 but, in fact, the word is older than that. As
far as I understand, it was first used in Bankruptcy Act of
1898. 31 It means making a property interest good against
Since 1962, the concept of perfection has been an essential part of Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, which applies to security interests in personal property
(including the sale of receivables). See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1),(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2001) (providing that, with exceptions, Article 9 “applies to (1) a
transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or
fixtures by contract . . . [and] a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or
promissory notes”). Perfection of a security interest provides superiority over subsequent
lien creditors, secured parties, and buyers of collateral. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-317(a)–(b)
(subordinating an unperfected security interest to lien creditors (which includes a
bankruptcy trustee under U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52)(C)), and to certain buyers, lessees and
licensees of collateral); U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(2) (subordinating an unperfected security
interest to a perfected security interest).
31 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 3 (1898) (amended 1938) (providing that
for purposes of determining whether there has been an “act[] of bankruptcy,”
referencing a transfer being “so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor
and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property . . . superior to
the rights of the transferee or assignee”); 11 U.S.C. § 60(a), (b), & (d) (using the same
concept for defining when a transfer has been “perfected” or been “made” for purposes
of the avoidance of preferential transfers). The current Bankruptcy Code also contains
two different definitions of “perfection” for purposes of avoidance of preferential
transfers or fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(e)(1), 548(d)(1). In addition, the
Bankruptcy Code uses variations of the word “perfect” in numerous systems. See, e.g., 11
30
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any subsequent purchaser of such property or a creditor
of a person that had transferred a property interest.
So the word “perfect” is used in a broader sense, not just
the Article 9 sense. If you want to perfect a transfer of an
interest in a real estate, what do you do? Typically, you have
to record some instrument in the designated land records
office that puts people on notice of the transfer. 32 If you
want to perfect an ownership interest in tangible items,
such as ordinary goods, 33 or certain payment rights that
have been reified into tangible form, such as tangible
chattel paper or promissory notes, possession is sufficient
to perfect. 34

U.S.C. § 362(a)(4)–(5) (providing acts to perfect liens on property violate the automatic
stay); U.C.C. § 362(b)(3), (18) (excepting from the automatic stay certain acts to perfect
or to continue or to maintain perfection of liens); U.C.C. § 544(a)(3) (providing that a
bankruptcy trustee has “the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property
of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by . . . a bona fide
purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable
law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser
and has perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether
or not such a purchaser exists”); U.C.C. § 546(b) (providing exceptions to the trustee’s
avoidance powers for certain interests perfected after the trustee’s avoidance power would
otherwise accrue).
32 Generally, the two predominant types of systems for perfecting interests in real
estate: race-notice and notice. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK ET AL., LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 11.9 at 764–74 (4th ed. 2019) (describing the operation of the different types of
recording systems). Under a race-notice system, an unrecorded conveyance is void as
against a bona-fide purchaser for value without notice if the subsequent purchaser
records the second conveyance first. Under a notice system, an unrecorded conveyance
is void as against a subsequent bona-fide purchaser for value without notice, even if the
subsequent purchaser does not record his or her conveyance. Generally, in either system,
if the first transferee records its conveyance, then all subsequent purchasers will have at
least constructive notice of the first conveyance.
33 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (providing that “[u]nless otherwise explicitly agreed title
passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance
with reference to the physical delivery of the goods” as well as exceptions for relating
good subject to a bill of lading); U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (providing that a “purchaser of goods
acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser
of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased”);
34 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (providing that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
subsection (b), a secured party may perfect a security interest in negotiable documents,
goods, instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper by taking possession of the
collateral”).
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So, if you merge ABC Corporation into XYZ
Corporation, Blackacre is now owned by XYZ
Corporation but record title is in ABC Corporation. There
are implications involved in not recording some kind of
record in the land records to demonstrate that there was
in fact a transfer. There are different ways to do that
depending, I think, upon the state law. This issue then
always raises the question of choice of law. 35 For instance,
a Delaware statute may be governing the merger, but
Blackacre is located in Tennessee. What does Tennessee
require or permit XYZ Corporation to record in the land
records? Would a certificate of merger be sufficient? Does
XYZ Corporation have to do a deed? Can XYZ
Corporation record a memorandum? 36 I do not know the
specific practice in Tennessee on these questions.
For personal property, if ABC owned and had possession
of tangible goods, and those tangible goods are now
owned and possessed by XYZ Corporation. So XYZ is
thus perfected, and to show that it has title, XYZ
Corporation can always point to the merger statue and say,
“Yes, we acquired this property interest through the
merger.” So, what additional steps may be needed to
perfect a transfer of any property interest will depend on
the specific property items that are being transferred.
Intellectual property is a whole different area with a lot of
complexity. In this area, a lot of things have to be done.
What about the typical rights to payment under a contract,
that is, ordinary rights to payment? Well, Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code governs the sale of rights of
payment. 37 However, in the case of a merger, Article 9
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 904 (McKinney 1998).
Section 66-24-101(a) of the Tennessee Code Annotated lists the writings that may
be “registered,” which means recording the writing in the register’s office. The first item
listed is “[a]ll agreements and bonds for the conveyance of real and personal property.”
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 66-24-101(a)(1) (2016). There does not appear to be any other
specific item listed that would apply in the case of real estate transferred as a result of a
merger. But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-4-409.
37 Article 9 incorporates the sale of receivables, which consist of accounts, chattel
paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes, through misleading definitions that
use terms of security to reflect the sale transaction. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see, e.g., U.C.C. 1-201(a)(35) (defining the term
“security interest” to include “any interest of . . . a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a
35
36
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does not apply to the sale of certain rights of payment
when you are transferring a whole business. 38 If Article 9
does not apply, then the parties must comply with the
common law rules for perfecting an assignment of a right
to payment. In some states, a right to payment is
automatically perfected upon assignment. 39
Now, does a merger statue, or a merger agreement
pursuant to the statute, qualify as “an assignment” for
purposes of those common laws rules? Is something else
needed, such as a separate written assignment? In other
jurisdictions, perfecting an assignment under common law
rules, in addition to a written assignment, requires
notification to the obligor of the assignment, which
payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9”);
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(12)(b) (defining “collateral” to include “accounts, chattel paper,
payment intangibles, and promissory notes that have been sold”); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28)(b)
(defining a “debtor” to include “a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles,
or promissory notes”); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73) (defining a “secured party” to include “a
person to which accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes have
been sold”); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(74) (defining a “security agreement” as “an agreement that
creates or provides for a security interest” which, because a security agreement includes
the interest of a buyer of receivables, includes a sale agreement for receivables).
38 See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(4),(6) (providing that “[t]his article does not apply to . . . a
sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes as part of a sale
of the business out of which they arose [or] . . . an assignment of a right to payment
under a contract to an assignee that is also obligated to perform under the contract”); see
also Health All. Network v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 354 F.Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y 2005); Marsh
Advantage Am. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 995 So. 2d 52 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
39 If ABC Corporation owns rights to payment governed by Article 9, that is, rights
to payment that did not arise out of the business or for which the owner has no future
performance obligations, the effectiveness and perfection of the sale of the rights to
payment will depend on complying with the requirements of Article 9. For rights to
payment that are “accounts”, defined as rights to payment for property that has been sold
or services that have been performed under U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2), an effective sale of the
account requires the authentication of a written sale agreement that describes the
accounts to be sold. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (providing that a “security interest [which
includes a buyer’s interest] is enforceable against the debtor [which includes a seller] and
third parties with respect to the collateral [(the accounts to be sold)] only if [among other
requirements] . . . the debtor [(seller)] has authenticated a security agreement [(sale
agreement)] that provides a description of the collateral [(the sold accounts)]”). To
perfect the security interest, that is the buyer’s interest. in the accounts, a financing
statement describing the accounts must be filed. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (providing that,
with exceptions not relevant for accounts, “a financing statement must be filed to perfect
all security interests”).
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typically will happen. If XYZ Corporation now owns a
right to payment that was owed to ABC Corporation and
wants to ensure that it will be paid, 40 XYZ Corporation
will send the obligors notice that states “Pay XYZ
Corporation instead of paying ABC Corporation, because
XYZ Corporation now owns this right to payment
pursuant to the merger of ABC Corporation into XYZ
Corporation.”
Many of the requirements for perfection will be taken care
of, but it will be necessary to look at the varying
requirements for each type of property item. So, for
example, I would feel very competent to analyze the
requirement for the types of property items, other than the
IP. I have dealt some with patents, but there is all kinds of
IP. How do you transfer each of these different kinds of
IP? How do you perfect such transfers? 41 I have not had
to deal with the different kinds of IP. Therefore, I would
want to get an IP specialist involved in analyzing the
requirements to ensure an effective and perfected transfer
of IP.
There are other considerations. Assume you have a lease,
and the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent
of a lessor. There are jurisdictions that would say, “Well,
but a merger is not a transfer, and a lease is ‘assigned’ for
purposes of the restriction on assignment.” I would
suggest that this conclusion actually probably violates
some of the subsidiary policy reasons why,
notwithstanding the long standing and pervasive principle
of free alienation of property, to allow a lessor prevent
alienation of the lessee’s interests in a leasehold interest.
Then there are other circumstances where XYZ
Corporation will want the merger to be treated as a
transfer. For example, if Blackacre is being transferred
from ABC Corporation to XYZ Corporation pursuant to
U.C.C. 9-406(a); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (SECOND) § 338 (1981).
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (providing that applications for patents or interests in
patents are assignable by a written instrument but that “an interest that constitutes as an
assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent
and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such
subsequent purchase or mortgage”).
40
41
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a merger, XYZ Corporation will want to be bona fide
purchaser for value in its own right for purposes of the
applicable real estate recording act. Can XYZ Corporation
record evidence of this transfer under the applicable real
estate recording act? If so, in those jurisdictions that have
enacted race-notice real estate recording acts, XYZ
Corporation would take priority over an unperfected
transfer by ABC Corporation before the merger. 42
In the case of a promissory note 43 that is payable to ABC
Corporation, it is now in the possession of XYZ
Corporation. Under Article 3 of the U.C.C., XYZ
Corporation is not the holder of that note 44 and cannot
enforce the note, unless it is a non-holder in possession of
the rights of a holder. 45 XYZ Corporation can become

Under a race notice recording act, if ABC Corporation had transferred an interest
in Blackacre to a third party for value who does not immediately record the document
evidencing this transfer, and then ABC Corporation merged into XYZ Corporation, if
XYZ Corporation was a bona fide purchaser, within the meaning of the recording act,
for value without notice of the third party transfer, XYZ Corporation would take priority
over the third party if XYZ recorded evidence of the transfer of Blackacre from ABC
Corporation to XYZ Corporation before the third party recorded the document
evidencing the transfer to it. See STOEBUCK ET AL., supra note 32, at 767-68.
43 I use the term “promissory note” to refer to a negotiable instrument that satisfies
the requirement of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The discussion in the
text also applies to a “draft,” which includes a “check”. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2002)
(providing that a negotiable instrument is an unconditional promise or order to pay a
fixed amount of money if it is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first
comes into possession of a holder; it is payable on demand or at a definite time and it
does not state any other undertakings or instructions other than the payment of money);
Id. § 104(e) (providing that a negotiable instrument is a “note if it is a promise to pay and
a “draft” if it is an order). Id. § 104(f) (providing that a “check” is a a draft, other than a
documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank). A note or a draft that is a
negotiable instrument must be in writing. Id. § 103(a)(8), (12). Many rights to payment,
however, are called “notes” or “promissory notes” that are not negotiable instruments
but ordinary contract rights to payment.
44 See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A) (2002) (defining a holder of a negotiable instrument
as “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer
or to an identified person that is the person in possession”).
45 See U.C.C. § 3-301 (2002) (providing that “person entitled to enforce” an
instrument is “(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the
instrument who has the rights of a holder” or (iii) in limited circumstances, a person that
previously was one of the foregoing but who is not in possession because the instrument
was lost or stolen).
42
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person with the rights of a holder if it is a “transferee.” 46
If the merger does not transfer the promissory note, XYZ
Corporation would not be a transferee under Article 3 of
the U.C.C., and XYZ Corporation would not be a person
entitled to enforce the note unless the merger statute itself
would be interpreted as giving XYZ Corporation all of the
rights of ABC Corporation as a holder. Although latter
interpretation is the most likely to be applicable, if there
was any doubt whether a merger either constitutes a
transfer under Article 3 of the U.C.C. or gives the XYZ
Corporation the rights of ABC Corporation as a holder,
the lawyers might require that every note payable to ABC
Corporation be endorsed and payable to XYZ
Corporation as part of the merger.
Those are all the kinds of considerations that lawyers have
to take into account, and again, each particular type of
property item is going to present different kinds of issues
that have to be looked at in the transaction.
Leatherman:

The tax law model for a merger is similar to the property
law model that Tom discussed. In a merger of a target
corporation into the acquiring corporation, under the
applicable merger statute by operation of law, the
acquiring corporation succeeds to the target corporation’s
assets and liabilities. The target corporation ceases to exist,
and the target shareholders relinquish their target stock
receiving consideration for that stock, typically provided
by the acquiring corporation. The tax law must in some
way explain how those events occur, and, barring
legerdemain or divine intervention, there are two likely
models that could be adopted. First, the acquiring
corporation could be treated as acquiring the target stock
from the target shareholders, and the target could then be
deemed to liquidate into the acquiring corporation with
the acquiring corporation succeeding to the target’s assets
and liabilities. Second, the target could be treated as

See id. § 3-203(a) (providing that an “instrument is transferred when it is delivered
by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery
the right to enforce the instrument”); id. § 3-203(b) (“Transfer of an instrument, whether
or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to
enforce the instrument, including any right as a holder in due course [except in the case
of a transferee that engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument]”).
46
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transferring its assets to the acquiring corporation in
exchange for the assumption of the target’s liabilities and
the consideration ultimately received by the target
shareholders. The target could then be deemed to
liquidate, distributing that consideration to the
shareholders. Despite strong arguments that may favor the
first model, 47 it is the second model that the Internal
Revenue Service and Congress (by implication) have
adopted. 48 Thus, in the merger of a target into an acquiring
corporation, there are two tax significant events – the
transfer of the target assets to the target corporation and
the target’s liquidation. The federal income tax
consequences of a merger are determined by applying the
applicable Code provisions to those two events. 49
Smith:

Professor Leatherman, what factors should be taken into
account in choosing the form of a transaction?

Leatherman:

In the merger of a target into the acquiring corporation,
the overall goal is to maximize the collective economic
after-tax benefits for the target shareholders and the
acquiring corporation. These parties often have adverse
interests, so that if the target shareholders receive more
after tax, the surviving corporation is going to have to pay
more.
Note, however, that although the interests of the parties
may in many ways be adverse, that is not necessarily true
with respect to tax issues. This is one reason that I really
enjoy structuring transactions as a tax lawyer. The reason
why the acquiring corporation and target shareholders may
be able to reach a common tax ground is as follows: there
are three parties vitally interested in tax consequences of
the merger – the target shareholders, the acquiring
corporation, and the Internal Revenue Service. One of the
parties (the Internal Revenue Service) is not at the table.
This means that the other two can take advantage of the

See Jeffrey L. Kwall, What is a Merger?: The Case for Taxing Cash Mergers Like Stock
Sales, 32 J. CORP. L. 1, at 10-11 (2006).
48 See Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104 (adopting the second model for a taxable
merger); I.R.C. § 361(a) and (c) (by implication adopting the second model for
reorganizations).
49 See supra notes 11–12 (for relevant Code sections for taxable and tax-free mergers).
47

344

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21

absent party. Often, the tax consequences can be managed
to maximize the values for the two parties at the table, and
the only people who pay are all the rest of us.
Consequently, the predominant determinant in structuring
a merger may be the federal income tax treatment of the
parties. By properly structuring the transaction to achieve
the optimal tax result, the parties may be able maximize
the aggregate after-tax economic benefits they receive.
Other steps in structuring a transaction include the
following: first, the acquiring corporation must perform
due diligence. 50 For example, it should determine the scope
of the target’s liabilities, a process that can take some time.
It should also determine whether there are any limitations
on the use of target assets (or assets of the acquiring
corporation) because of the merger. Second, it may be
necessary to secure the approval of not only the target
shareholders but also the shareholders of the acquiring
corporation. Third, the parties must negotiate
representations and warranties to be given by the acquiring
corporation or target shareholders. Fourth, the merger will
likely occasion filing fees and may result in e-taxes, in
addition to federal income taxes, including state taxes, local
taxes, foreign taxes, real property transfer taxes, and even
excise taxes. Fifth, almost every transaction requires some
paperwork in addition to the merger agreement. For
example, intellectual property (for example, patents) may
have to be re-registered, and if either the target or
acquiring corporation is a consolidated group member, a
tax sharing agreement may have to be negotiated and
prepared. Further, in a public deal, a registration statement
must be prepared which is a costly step. The sad part, at
least from my vantage point, is that attorney’s fees are
more like rounding errors in those transactions, paling in
comparison to investment banker fees.
Plank:

I was just going to say, investment bankers have to eat too.

Leatherman:

Yes, but does it have to be caviar?

Thankfully, this drudgery is not typically imposed on the tax lawyers. That work
in a large firm is generally borne by corporate associates, no doubt to atone for their
many sins.
50
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Smith:

Is it possible for a single person to act as a lawyer for a
merger or other business combination transaction? Or is a
team of lawyers required?

Heminway:

I am going to go last on this one. Tom, do you want to go
first?

Plank:

Well, I think it depends on how complicated the
transaction is. Obviously if you have a small transaction
with two lawyers are involved instead of one lawyer, such
as a lawyer for the deal, there is a lot of costs involved. But
then the other question is, does the one lawyer have the
expertise to address all of the issues? For instance, I can
handle the property issues, but I could not handle the
mergers and acquisitions issues. I could not do the
corporate compliance tasks, but I could certainly do
almost all of the property law matters, except the IP. If
there was IP involved, I would have to get somebody else
involved. I could not do the tax issues.
So, I think it all just depends. I just think that, to the extent
possible, even though the costs go up, it is always better to
have two lawyers looking at a transaction to make sure that
the deal is structured properly.

Heminway:

Don, you told us a story yesterday that might be relevant
here.

Leatherman:

As Tom said, it’s really difficult to know everything about
the transaction, and for small deals, it may practically be
impossible. However, in a small deal, the parties may lack
significant financial resources; for example, motivating two
persons forming a corporation to use the same attorney.
That use raises real ethical issues, because the parties
typically have different interests, raising obvious conflicts.
I’ve also seen some small transactions in recent years,
where the lawyers don’t really understand significant tax
issues involved in the transaction. Sometimes, those
transactions are structured assuming a tax result based on
a mistaken understanding (or even an ignorance) of
relatively technical tax rules.
Oddly, at the end of the day, I’m not sure how much it
matters for this reason. The Internal Revenue Service
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agents who may examine those small transactions may also
not understand those technical tax rules and may just
question whether the transaction, as reported, “appears”
to reach a fair tax result. In other words, if those tax results
seem fair, they may not be challenged. Nevertheless, a
lawyer cannot count on that sort of generosity from the
Internal Revenue Service. Further, it is much more likely
that the bigger deals, where the representatives are more
sophisticated, will be examined with more care. I’m afraid
I’m taking too long to tell the story.
Heminway:

No, I think that is a good summary. I agree with everything
that Tom and Don have said about the sophistication of
business combination transactions and the lawyers that
may be representing people involved in them. Experience
tells me that it is really hard to do mergers and acquisitions
well—to be fully compliant with, even for a small deal,
Model Rule 1.1, if a person is a solo practitioner. Some of
the challenges can be overcome by diligence—by going in
and asking other experts to share their wisdom, which
requires having instrumental connections in the local,
regional, or national bar. Having said that, as I reflect on
Don’s remarks about taxation, I believe he has wonderfully
summarized what are incredibly complex rules relating to
mergers.

Leatherman:

Complex and elegant.

Heminway:

Complex, yes, indeed. And I will let you characterize them
as elegant! I certainly am of the view that the merger rules
are an elegant part of business associations law, but
perhaps you would not agree.
In listening to Tom talk about the effects of mergers on
different forms of property, property-related filings, and
the assignment and anti-assignment provisions in
contracts, it struck me that it might be important to note
that the effects of anti-assignment provisions depend on
the type of transaction and the way that it is structured.
Courts also play a leading role in this area. We see a lot of
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different judicial opinions in that area, construing specific
language in different contexts. 51
That is also true for licenses and permits. Depending on
the applicable license or permit and the structure of the
transaction, a merger or acquisition may trigger the need
for a transfer or other action. My first deal as an M&A
lawyer involved an asset purchase transaction in which
individual restaurant liquor licenses needed to be reapplied for, and we needed to get fingerprints and
photographs from each restaurant location’s manager. This
was for a burger and beer place, so if the beer part was not
there, it would be a significant problem for the acquiror.
We had to make sure that the new liquor licenses were all
in place by the time that acquisition closed. That meant
that we needed local counsel in each state to argue for the
assignment of those permits in front of the local liquor
permitting authority. The junior lawyer on the
transactional team or an experienced legal assistant gets
assigned that task, which involves reviewing all of the
permits and registrations and making sure that each local
counsel is doing its job. That was my job, in some part, for
my first few months as a lawyer.
In an asset purchase, the legal team also must decide
whether the entire business or substantially all of the assets
of that business will be, is being, or has been purchased
and must determine the effect of that judgment on
property assignments and filings. Also at issue: different
jurisdictions’ choice of law issues. The M&A lawyer also
must consider the assumption of liabilities—which
liabilities the combined business intends to be subject to
as a result of the transaction—and the effect of pending
See, e.g., Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 62 A.3d 62,
82 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Generally, mergers do not result in an assignment by operation of
law of assets that began as property of the surviving entity and continued to be such
after the merger.”); Star Cellular Tel. Co. v. Baton Rouge CGSA, Inc., No. CIV. A. 12507,
1993 WL 294847, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 1993), aff ’d, 647 A.2d 382 (Del. 1994) (“The
drafters of the Agreement could have provided that the antitransfer clause of
Section 13.1 would apply to all transfers, including those . . . arising by operation of law.
They did not. . . . In these circumstances, the Court will not attribute to the contracting
parties an intent to prohibit the Merger where the transaction did not materially increase
the risks to or otherwise harm the limited partners.”).
51
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or threatened litigation. All of this is what kept me up at
night when I was actively working on mergers and
acquisitions.
The M&A lawyer is not only in charge of doing that
diligence but also, as the deal progresses, working with
other lawyers who understand other compliance pieces of
the puzzle. I am not an expert in every area of law needed
to fully vet a merger or acquisition structure or agreement.
I need a “Don Leatherman” for tax compliance. I need a
“Tom Plank” for property law issues, supplemented by a
“Gary Pulsinelli” 52 for intellectual property law expertise.
I might need, depending on the transaction, someone who
knows about environmental law because of toxic spills or
Superfund litigation. 53 You know, there is just a whole
bunch of law involved in mergers and acquisitions.
Then, there are the legal issues I have to worry about as a
business lawyer—things like the need for stockholder
Gary Pulsinelli teaches intellectual property law courses at The University of
Tennessee College of Law. For information about him and his teaching, see his faculty
web page on the College if Law’s Directory, Gary Pulsinelli, https://law.utk.
edu/directory/gary-pulsinelli/.
53 See Sara Beth Watson & Kristina M. Woods, Environmental Issues in Transactions: Old
Swamps and New Bridges, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, FALL 2000, at 75, 124 (offering that
“the environmental lawyer’s challenge in these transactions is . . . to identify the potential
risks, work with the technical advisors to scope out the magnitude and likelihood of the
risks, point out the problems that may arise if issues are left to chance and ambiguous
drafting, and ensure the client understands risks and alternatives so that reasonable
business decisions are possible.”). One commentator explained the demand for
environmental counsel in this context almost thirty years ago:
52

Transactional environmental law has grown rapidly since the passage
of CERCLA in 1980. CERCLA did not create environmental risk in
business transactions, but it did increase it multifold. “[S]ophisticated
purchasers are turning increasingly to environmental lawyers to help
them avoid this risk.” Basically, this requires the negotiation of
contractual provisions that pertain to environmental liabilities. These
contracts may involve the sale of real property, corporate assets, or
even a stock purchase. In any case, some amount of environmental
risk will pass with the transaction. Determining liability and how it
will be contained or transferred is the job of a transactional
environmental attorney.”
John C. Buckley, Considering Environmental Law, 1 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 18 (1991)
(footnote omitted).
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approval, appraisal rights, and proxy statements, as well as
responding to SEC comments on a registration statement
if a non-exempt offer and sale of stock is involved. Merger
and acquisitions involve a lot of legal questions arising
under many different areas of law, and as a result, I am
painfully aware that work in this field always implicates
Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3 54 in one way or another. For
example, given the attention to detail involved in mergers
and acquisitions, I always have been mindful of one of the
less frequently cited comments to Model Rule 1.3 that ties
it in with Model Rule 1.1: “A lawyer’s workload must be
controlled so that each matter can be handled
competently.” 55
I will just leave it at that; I think I have said enough about
those professional responsibility concerns. In all honesty,
however, there is a lot of other content in the Model Rules
that may give us pause in considering engaging in a
mergers and acquisitions practice as an individual
person—a solo practitioner. I have been involved in
transactions where the other side was single-lawyered.
Although I can tell you that I would not stand up in front
of the bar and testify that there was a lack of competence,
sometimes I needed to bring the other lawyer along a little
bit and offer some help. Mostly, I would ask questions.
“Have you asked this of your client? Have you asked that?
Have you thought about this?” While you may regard me
as a little bit of a Debbie Downer, I am hesitant to say that
a single lawyer can actually provide competent legal
services in all but the simplest business combinations. 56
Plank:

I just wanted to add one thing in terms of the property.
There is a complete range of properties interests and
different kinds of property items. I was fortunate since I
had done real estate, real estate development, real estate
finance, and then commercial finance. So, I’m familiar with
real estate, real estate development and finance and

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.1.1, 1.3 (AM . BAR ASS’N 2016).
Id. at r.1.3 cmt. 2.
56 See Ed Finkel, The Rise of the Freelance Lawyer, 102 ILL. B.J. 576, 578 (2014) (observing,
in regard to a freelance lawyer’s ability to practice competently, that “real estate closings can
easily be done as piece-work and scheduled around other obligations. . . . Mergers and
acquisitions are another matter.”).
54
55
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commercial finance. In the commercial finance area in
particular, I developed a specialty in receivables finance,
which is totally different than financing equipment.
So, I can cover a lot of those areas, but there are a lot of
lawyers who’ve spent their time dealing with real estate and
who know real estate, but they just do not know
commercial finance. There are a lot of commercial finance
lawyers who don’t really know much about real estate. So,
if you have just one person who knows a lot about
commercial finance, but doesn’t know real estate, well that
could be a problem just in the context of solving only the
property related aspects of a merger. 57
Heminway:

And they are separate classes in law school.

Plank:

That’s right.

Heminway:

Let’s turn the program over to Dixon, and then do
questions. 58
* * *

Smith:

So, do we have any questions?

Audience:

I would like to ask about solo practitioners. I always think
there’s a reason why a lot of your solo practitioners are
litigators, and you don’t see a lot of solo practitioners
doing transactional work. I wonder, what do we tell our
law students, many of whom want to go hang up the
shingle on their own, in this regard? Based on y’all’s
comments, practicing mergers and acquisitions law as a
solo practitioner may be dangerous. The inability to know
when to engage others with expertise can often get one
into trouble. It’s like you’ve got blinders on and you don’t

In addition, a real estate lawyer would not normally be expected to know that
Article 9 of the UCC, which is entitled “Security Interests,” also governs the sale of
receivables, especially since and Article 9 terms of security to incorporate such sales. See
supra note 30. Accordingly, the real estate lawyer—and indeed many commercial finance
lawyer who specialize in financing inventory or other goods or assets other than
accounts—would not know that Article 9 applies to the sale of accounts and therefore
that the filing of a financing statement is necessary to perfect such sales. Id.
58 Dixon Babb’s commentary is published in the article immediately following this
one. See 21 TENN. J. BUS. L. 357 (2020).
57
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know what you might see if they were removed. I guess
I’m just asking, what advice do we have for law students
who want to go out on their own and handle business
combinations? Do we tell them that’s a terrible idea? Do
we tell them that you have to go in with others? What do
we tell them?
Heminway:

Do you want to talk about this, Tom?

Plank:

I will. First of all, I think that when law students come to
law school, most of what they know about the law is
litigation. Before coming to law school, students read
about litigation, can read about constitutional law issues
and tort law issues. Rarely does one read in the newspaper
about how a person will finance the new shopping center
that’s going to be located at Turkey Creek. Students don’t
read about that kind of stuff.
Then, I think they come to law school and realize, well, it’s
not just about litigation, there’s other areas. My
understanding is—and I do not think that over time the
numbers have changed all that much—litigation only
makes up about a third of a legal practice. I do think going
out by yourself would be scary as a transactional lawyer,
unless the lawyer just basically developed a particular
specialty and then developed a reputation in that particular
specialty. Then, if some other issue comes along, the
lawyer has to get somebody else in there.
I do know of people who’ve done that, but it’s usually a
fairly, maybe a technical type of specialty. Maybe an IP type
of specialty.

Leatherman:

I think the practice of law has changed a lot. When I first
started practicing many, many years ago, my sense was that
there was more of a sense of community in the practicing
bar. Older lawyers would help younger lawyers who were
coming into practice. So, in some ways it was easier to start
out as a solo practitioner. If I were thinking about advising
a student who wanted to go out and do transactional work,
I would tell the student to try to find some mentors. Maybe
associate with a good accountant who’s going to
understand a lot of the issues; good accountants often
have seen a lot of the issues that are likely to come up
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regularly. But there are often traps for the inexperienced
that are really frightening. When I am an attorney on a deal,
I am frightened that I am going to miss something. It’s just,
the law is just really complex, and transactional law is
difficult to practice by oneself.
Heminway:

I agree with both of those things.
First of all, to a point that Tom made, I notice that my
colleague Professor Eric Amarante walked in. He and I will
be teaching a first-year class next semester that does
introduce first year law students to the concept of
transactional business lawyering. Through this course, we
hope to correct some of the problem of people coming
to law school, going through their whole first year, and
seeing mostly litigation—maybe seeing a bit of
transactional business work in a context where that was
not the focus. The University of Tennessee College of
Law is trying to overcome that litigation bias in the firstyear curriculum.
I also agree with Don about the sense of community and
reaching out to mentors in certain areas, and maybe in
M&A, depending on what the knowledge base of the
student is. If, for example, Dixon wanted to go out and
hang his own shingle, I would sit down with him and say,
“Okay, so you’ve had these courses that help prepare you
for an M&A practice. But what are you taking your last
semester of law school?” I would ask if he is a student
member of the Tennessee Bar Association and whether he
planned to participate in programs that focus on starting a
solo practice. I also would ask if he was meeting with other
people in the M&A field who are senior people—people
he could then use as mentors. Those are all potentially
powerful actions for law students to take.
Having said that, we also must tell our students that we
each need to use our own conscience when we make these
determinations about how and whether to engage in
specific types of practice and that we also should seek the
counsel and approval of our peers. 59 That’s important. If

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[A]
lawyer is . . . guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers.”).
59
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your peers tell you, “I think you have the knowledge to do
this,” if you honestly believe you have the knowledge after
searching your conscience, then you may ethically
determine to take on a matter. And if you take on that
client matter, then you must zealously advocate on behalf
of that client. 60 Which may mean (among other things)
reaching out to other people for advice, doing more
diligence, and staying up at night to resolve legal issues.
But you also should tell students that they have the right
to refuse the client. Legal counsel may do that and
undertake to find an expert firm to represent the client.
Much larger firms, not just single person shops, advise
their clients to take on specialty counsel for particularly
specialized or sophisticated transactions. In my practice, I
often was the beneficiary of those kinds of referrals. So,
you may want to take my advice on this with a grain of
salt. However, I do think that a solo practitioner can make
a decision, even if it is financially disadvantageous to that
practitioner, from an ethical perspective, to refuse a client
matter in an area where the complexity is too great. That
is hard because the lawyer still needs to put food on the
table. But the lawyer can find other work, develop practice
networks, etc. so there will be enough work absent those
complex transactions to be able to make a living. Don’t
overextend yourself—that would be my advice.
Plank:

I just had one more comment as a corollary to the
question. The other side of that coin is, if a relatively new
law school graduate starts law practice with a firm or
government agency, the new lawyer will find that there’s
tremendous pressure to start specializing right away. That
early specialization can lead to not developing as broad an
understanding of issues and areas of the law.
I was very fortunate. I joined the best law firm in the state
of Maryland out of law school. I got to work in the
“general department,” and there was some real estate
finance, government law and finance, administrative law,
legislation, and litigation, but it was only because there

Id. Preamble ¶9 (noting that principles underlying the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct “include the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s
legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law”).
60

354

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21

were two partners in the general department who had a
very wide and varied practice.
So I was the beneficiary. I had to do it all. I ended up
spending my first seven years with this law firm and the
Maryland Attorney General’s office doing almost every
different kind of law, other than criminal law and family
law, and it was terrific, but it was hard. I worked hard, and
I learned a lot about different areas of the law.
Then finally I said, you know, I’ve got to figure out what I
want to be when I grow up, and I finally decided to
specialize in commercial law. But that experience helped
me a tremendous amount. I had several trials, including
one jury trial. Every business lawyer should have a least
one jury trial, but it’s very hard for those associates to get
that kind of practice. You go to the corporate department,
you’re going to do corporate. That is all you’re going to do.
You’re not going to do property, you’re not going to do
tax. I mean, you’ll run into issues in those areas and I do
think that it is important to understand the other areas.
How do you avoid that specialization that’s going to
restrict your ability to see things in new and different ways?
Heminway:

Actually, Tom, your comment raises one more thing. I
think we maybe have one other question, too, so I will just
handle this briefly. I consider summer associate, or
summer job positions, and work during law school to be a
way of developing, rather than narrowing, expertise. That
was my experience. I developed an interest, passion, and
foundational aptitude in corporate finance law through
employment outside (but during) law school.
In the beginning of law school, I did not know what
corporate finance law was. I did not take any
undergraduate classes that were in the business area. It was
a job that I got in the second semester of my first year of
law school, working as a legal assistant for a private firm,
that turned me on to this field and gave me some
experience. By the time I started full-time work in a law
firm, I could already do things like draft board resolutions
with confidence. I also knew what an indenture was, even
though that had not been covered in any law school class.
As a result, I firmly believe that out-of-law-school learning
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can be powerful as a foundation to a specialized law
practice.
Audience:

Really more of a comment than a question, but some of
the firms that I interviewed with when I was coming out
of law school had a program where you rotated
departments, not just during the summer, but actually
during your first two years after law school. I didn’t go to
one of those firms, but looking back, I think that would
be interesting. I was an M&A lawyer, and so many of my
fellow associates went in-house. They then were tasked
with running the whole deal themselves. They would call
me, and they’d say: “We’re used to having a tax person on
the deal, and a property person, and an ERISA person.”
Now they are told: “You do it.”

Heminway:

The in-house version of the solo practitioner, right?

Audience:

Yes. It would have been helpful, I think, if they had rotated
through different areas of practice in a private firm before
they went in-house. They would have at least known a little
bit better what they didn’t know—where they really, really
do need help—and maybe even know better how to do
some of the more simple stuff on their own. So, for the
law students, that might be a program that they would find
interesting to help prepare them for a well-rounded
transactional business law practice later.

